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Abstract—To support location-based services, vehicles must
share their location with a server to receive relevant data,
compromising their (location) privacy. To alleviate this privacy
compromise, the vehicle’s location can be obfuscated by adding
artificial noise. Under limited available bandwidth, and since the
area including the vehicle’s location increases with the noise,
the server will provide fewer data relevant to the vehicle’s true
location, reducing the effectiveness of a location-based service.
To alleviate this problem, we propose that data relevant to a
vehicle is also provided through direct, ad hoc communication
by neighboring vehicles. Through such Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V)
cooperation, the impact of location obfuscation is mitigated. Since
vehicles subscribe to data of (location-dependent) impact values,
neighboring vehicles will subscribe to largely overlapping sets
of data, reducing the benefit of V2V cooperation. To increase
such benefit, we develop and study a non-cooperative game
determining the data that a vehicle should subscribe to, aiming
at maximizing its utilization while considering the participat-
ing (neighboring) vehicles. Our analysis and results show that
the proposed V2V cooperation and derived strategy lead to
significant performance increase compared to non-cooperative
approaches and largely alleviates the impact of privacy on
location-based services.
Index Terms—Floating Car Data, location-based services, lo-
cation privacy, V2V communication.
I. INTRODUCTION
The vehicles of the future will be required to have increased
awareness about their environment to assist drivers or support
autonomous driving. This awareness has typically been pro-
vided by different sensors on board the vehicles, measuring
vital data about the environment of the vehicle. The context
data provided by these sensors is limited to the vehicle’s
immediate environment due to the sensors’ inherent physical
limitations, such as their range. Nevertheless, information
pertaining to an environment not in the immediate vicinity
of a vehicle is also important for traffic safety, routing and
navigation, as such vehicle can consider upcoming events in
their planning. To make such information available to far away
vehicles, first, vehicles receiving this information through
local detection should communicate it to a remote server
using an appropriate communications infrastructure such as the
cellular network. Then, the vehicles desiring to receive such
information should indicate so to the server, and receive it via
a similar infrastructure. By exchanging their local perception
of the environment via a cellular infrastructure, vehicles can
supplement their local perception with distant data provided
by other vehicles.
In order for vehicles to get Floating Car Data (FCD) that
are relevant to their context, they have to continuously share
their location with a centralized back-end server in the network
that is assumed to be a trusted entity. The server filters
out the relevant FCD for vehicles based on their location
and distributes them accordingly. This continuous context and
location exchange with a server is an invasion to the privacy of
the vehicles. Consequently, privacy-sensitive users either have
to accept this privacy invasion or turn off the option of receiv-
ing FCD. Clearly, users that decide to turn off receipt of FCD
cannot benefit from location-based services and other services
enabled by vehicular networks. It is therefore desirable to have
a mechanism that allows for effective transfer of FCD to and
from the network while preserving the privacy of the users
involved, like adding noise to the location (obfuscation).
Since not all data are equally important to a vehicle, they
are classified based on some impact level. Higher impact data
are prioritized by the server since the available bandwidth
is limited. In practice, vehicles subscribe to data of some
(location-dependent) impact level, and the server provides to
the vehicle all available data with matching impact. Privacy-
concerned vehicles that do not report their exact location will
end up receiving a smaller portion of data of a given impact
due to the need to accommodate such data relevant to a larger
geographic area. As a result, location-based services would be
less effectively provided to privacy-concerned vehicles.
To alleviate this problem and increase the amount of
location-relevant data provided to the vehicles, we propose
that data relevant to a vehicle’s location is also provided by
neighboring vehicles through direct, ad hoc communication.
That is, consider Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) cooperation for
exchanging local relevant data. Through this, the impact
of location obfuscation (i. e. increased area containing the
vehicle’s true location) is mitigated to some extent. Such
V2V cooperation based on vehicle clusters has also been
considered in [1]. As it will be discussed later and shown in
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the results, besides the higher complexity of a cluster-based
approach, it also suffers greatly from connectivity problems
reducing greatly its performance. In the current work, besides
incorporating privacy considerations, the V2V communication
is not cluster-based but ad hoc through direct V2V exchanges.
Notice that neighboring vehicles without coordination are
expected to subscribe to largely overlapping sets of data,
reducing the potential benefit of V2V cooperation. To increase
such benefit potential, we develop and study a non-cooperative
game determining the data that a vehicle should subscribe
to, so that the aforementioned overlap is reduced. The design
goal is to maximize a properly defined utilization function as
shaped by the participating (neighboring) vehicles as well. Our
analysis and results show that the proposed V2V cooperation
scheme and derived strategy lead to significant performance
increase compared to non-cooperative approaches and largely
alleviates the impact of privacy on location-based services.
In summary, the contributions of this work are the following:
First, we introduce privacy considerations in the management
of FCD and point to its impact on location-based services;
given a fixed bandwidth availability, some data are not for-
warded to a vehicle due to privacy considerations and the
implemented location obfuscation. Second, and in order to
alleviate the latter problem, we propose that vehicles coop-
erate and forward relevant data to their neighboring vehicles,
enhancing in principle the data received by a vehicle besides
those directly from the remote server; an ad-hoc, direct V2V
cooperation paradigm is employed instead of a cluster-based
one, also showing the high performance deterioration of the
latter in a real vehicular networking environment. Third, a
major contribution is the development and study of a non-
cooperative game determining the strategies (in terms of
probabilities that a vehicle is forwarded by the server data
of a given impact index) that vehicles should follow, so that a
properly defined utility is maximized; this is shown to lead to
a diversification of the data received directly from the server
by neighboring vehicles and increases the effectiveness of
V2V cooperation. Finally, the aforementioned contributions
are supported through numerical and simulation results.
The rest of the article follows thus: In Section II, we give a
brief overview of some related work in the literature. In Sec-
tion III, we provide an overview of the system scenario while
in Section IV, we describe the influence of location privacy
on the network. In Section V, we describe our proposed game
theoretic approach for privacy sensitive communication and we
provide the necessary adaptations and assumptions necessary
for the method in Section VI. In Section VII, we evaluate the
performance of our method and we conclude this paper in
Section VIII with some discussions about our findings.
II. RELATED WORK
Since vehicles have to continuously update their location to
a centralized back-end server to receive FCD that is relevant
to their context. This is a breach of privacy for the users as
their personal data can be shared with third parties. Several
techniques have been introduced in the literature to protect
users’ privacy in vehicular networks. Some of the common
techniques include the use of pseudonyms [2]–[4], obfuscation
[5], [6], and the use of group communications [7]–[9].
The use of pseudonyms involves users taking on another
identity (pseudonyms) to dissociate their actual identity from
their data [10]. The use of a single pseudonym is less effective
and it is often required for users to change pseudonyms
through their journey to sustain their level of privacy [11].
Such pseudonym changes are usually done in mix zones where
drivers have to switch pseudonyms [12]. These mix zones can
be fixed [13] or specified dynamically [14]. However, the use
of pseudonyms have been shown to be less effective against
a global eavesdropper [15], and especially in environments
with low car density like on highways. Furthermore, the use
of pseudonyms usually focuses on eavesdroppers monitoring
V2V communications and involves having to deal with a
trusted (or semi-trusted) server which coordinates the assign-
ments of pseudonyms [8]. This still involves trusting a central
server which is a risk in the case that an adversary gets hold
of such server. Our work focuses on the privacy of users in
their communications with the central server.
Likewise, obfuscation has been used extensively in privacy
protection in vehicular networks and location-based services.
Obfuscation involves users providing one (i) an inaccurate
location, (ii) an imprecise region including their real location,
or (iii) a vague description of their location [16]. To quantify
the effectiveness of obfuscation, metrics like k-anonimity,
which means a user’s location is indistinguishable from k− 1
other users, have been introduced [17], [18]. The imprecision
added into the location of the users usually leads to users
getting less relevant data and, thus, a decrease in efficiency.
Our method mitigates against this decrease in performance
by implicitly cooperating with other vehicles to get relevant
updates through V2V communication.
For this purpose, game-theory has been applied to model
aspects of privacy, especially in mobile networks and location-
based services [19], [20] and in security and privacy as-
sessment of vehicular networks [21]. Distinct from previous
studies, our work focuses on privacy of users in their com-
munications with the server considering the impact of the
messages to the user. We adopt an obfuscation technique by
reporting a region instead of their exact location and mitigate
against the resulting reduction in performance by implicitly
cooperating the vehicles through a game-theoretic approach,
which maximizes the relevant data received by the vehicles.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
In the following, we provide an overview of the considered
system model. We assume a context-aware vehicular network,
in which a central server transmits context-sensitive messages
to interested vehicles. In this network, time is assumed to
be slotted (typically 1s). Every vehicle has a limited average
bandwidth A (in bits per time slot) to receive these messages
via the cellular network. This assigned bandwidth is generally
low compared to the maximum (physically) available band-
width, such that vehicles may exceed this bandwidth temporar-
ily (as long as the average consumed bandwidth matches the
predefined value). A message contains FCD as payload, as
well as additional meta-information such as the measurement
location, measurement time, and type of FCD. In this work,
we assume that FCD refer to or carry road-related information
(e.g., accidents, traffic jams, traffic flow information, etc.)
that can be useful for improving the driving behavior of the
vehicles in proximity. Let a(m) (in bits) denote the size of
such message m, r(m) the radius of its dissemination area,
and µ(m) its impact, which all depend on the type of contained
FCD; e. g., an accident has generally higher impact than traffic
flow information. We use this notation as our bandwidth is
limited, and thus, the impact per utilized bandwidth is pivotal
for our approach. Based on the message impact µ(m) and the
dissemination area r(m), we divide messages in nµ impact
levels; an impact level i ∈ {1, . . . , nµ} contains messages if
r(m) = ri and µ(m) ∈ [µi, µi+1), where ri is radius of the
dissemination area and µi the impact per bit assigned to impact
level i. For every impact level, there is an expected impact µi,
which refers to the average impact per bit of a message in this
impact level. For i = nµ, we set the upper bound µi+1 =∞.
A vehicle can control the reception of messages from the
server by expressing interest in certain impact levels and by
providing a representation of its location. More specifically, a
vehicle wants to receive a message m if (i) it has expressed
interest in the corresponding impact level i of the message
(ii) the vehicle’s location is at most at distance ri from
the source of the FCD. Let ai denote the traffic load of
messages of impact level i (in bits per time slot) expected
for the vehicle if the provided location is accurate. A vehicle
is either interested in an impact level or not, i. e., receives
either all or no messages of this impact level. This interest
can be changed dynamically at the beginning of every time
slot. Depending on the assumed privacy-sensitivity (referred
to as privacy-level) φ ∈ Φ of a vehicle v, the aforementioned
representation of the location may be accurate or may be
imprecise. We implement this imprecision by providing only
an (circular) area in which the vehicle is certainly located
(uniformly distributed), without actually revealing the exact
location to the server. The privacy level φ chosen by the
respective vehicle determines the radius rφ of this area. That
imprecise representation of the location increases the load
of received messages due to the less accurate server-side
filtering. To capture the additional bandwidth consumption,
let aφ,i > ai denote the load of messages (in bits) expected in
a certain by a vehicle impact level i for a vehicle at a privacy
level φ.
The central server uses the announced interest of the vehi-
cles to actively push new messages (i. e., messages containing
yet unknown FCD) via the cellular network to them. Since
the available bandwidth is assumed to be limited, a vehicle
aims to maximize the total impact of the received messages,
which is achieved by dropping low-impact messages if the
bandwidth is insufficient. To maximize that total impact of
received messages, vehicles may cooperate to share band-
width for the reception of messages; i. e., vehicles can locally
broadcast messages, received via the cellular network, without
additional costs to notify vehicles in their proximity. Thus, not
every vehicle needs to receive all messages of its interest via
the limited cellular bandwidth, as these messages might be
provided by its neighbors.
IV. INFLUENCE OF LOCATION OBFUSCATION
In the following, we provide an insight on the influence
of privacy in our model. Each privacy level φ > 1 adds a
certain level of imprecision to the provided location, while
φ = 1 refers to no privacy-sensitivity. The privacy-sensitivity
and, thus, location imprecision increases with φ and reduces
the accuracy of the context-based message filtering at the
server-side. Thus, a vehicle receives messages not relevant
for its current context, while its share of relevant messages
is reduced. This influences the number of received messages
nφ,i and their expected impact per bit µφ,i for a privacy state
φ and an impact-level i. The number of messages received
typically increases with increasing privacy level, while the
expected impact per bit of a message decreases. We reflect
this change for every impact level i by the adaptation factor
ρφ,i as shown in Equation 1 and Equation 2.
aφ,i = ai · ρφ,i (1)
µφ,i =
µi
ρφ,i
(2)
ρφ,i depends on the context-sensitivity of the distributed
messages for a vehicle of privacy level φ receiving mes-
sages with impact level i. For non-context-sensitive messages,
ρφ,i = 1,∀φ ∈ Φ. For context-sensitive of messages, i. e.,
a messages with a specific distribution-area with radius ri,
ρφ,i ≥ 1,∀φ ∈ Φ. These statements are proven in Theorem 1.
Theorem 1. The adaptation factor for a network with uni-
formly distributed messages is ρφ,i = (rφ/ri + 1)
2 for a
circular geocast-area and a circular location-imprecision,
where ri is the radius of the geocast-area of the message of
impact level i and rφ is the radius of the location-imprecision
area of privacy-level φ.
Proof. Without location privacy, the vehicle receives all mes-
sages with a maximum distance of ri to its current location.
Thus, area of interest for the vehicle is pi · r2i . If the vehicle
reduces the precision of its location by hiding inside an area of
radius rφ, the server will need to transmit all messages within
a distance of rφ+ri from the center of the area to ensure that
the vehicle receives all relevant messages. The size of this area
is pi · (rφ + ri)2. This leads to ρφ,i = (rφ/ri + 1)2.
V. GAME-THEORETIC MODEL FOR PRIVACY-SENSITIVE
COMMUNICATION
To enhance the performance of our impact-aware vehicular
network, we employ a game-theoretic model with the aim to
maximize the sum of impact of the received messages. Our
innovative approach relies only on the number nφ of vehicles
of each privacy-level φ in proximity to find a mixed Nash-
optimal solution for our developed game-theoretic model, i. e.,
vehicles receive messages with a certain probability. In our
game, each actor (vehicle) aims to find the strategy (receive
messages in a certain impact-range via the cellular network)
that maximizes its utility (sum of impact values of all received
messages, directly via cellular or from the neighbors) while
sticking to cellular bandwidth constraints. This game is played
periodically in every time slot to adjust the vehicles behavior
to environmental changes, i. e. changes in the number of
neighbors in proximity and changes in number of messages.
Notice that vehicles are assumed to cooperate; thus, a vehicle
might additionally receive messages directly by vehicles in
proximity. The intuition behind this game model is that high-
impact messages are generally prioritized, as their bandwidth
usage is more efficient compared to low-impact messages.
Thus, vehicles may rely on their neighbors to provide some
high-impact messages to them, as a number of neighbors aims
to receive these high-impact messages. These vehicles can then
use a part of their available cellular bandwidth to receive low-
impact messages and share these with their neighbors. The
idea is similar to cooperative caching. Instead of storing all
high-demand message at every local cache, some nodes fetch
low-demand messages instead and satisfy the request of high-
demand messages from nearby cooperative caches [22].
The vehicles are the only actors in this game; the server is
not directly involved, but only determines the set of receivers
of messages based on the strategies chosen by the vehicles. For
this purpose, the vehicles share their strategy in the form of
subscriptions with the server. The strategy is represented as a
vector ~pφ with nµ probability entries pφ,i with i ∈ {1, . . . , nµ}
and depends on the chosen privacy level of the vehicle
φe. Each entry pφ,i refers to the probability of the tagged
vehicles to receive messages of the corresponding impact level.
Additionally, 0 ≤ pφ,i ≤ 1,∀pφ,i ∈ ~pφ. For the assignment of
messages to an impact level, we use the expected impact µi,
i. e., the average impact of a message of that type given it is
relevant for the vehicle. µi does not depend on the privacy
level φ. The privacy-dependent message impact µφ,i is only
used for the calculation of the utility for a vehicle. In the
calculation, ~pφ needs to be chosen such that Equation 3 holds,
with aφ,i being the expected number of received messages of
impact level i and privacy level φ according to Equation 1,
and A being the usable bandwidth.
nµ∑
i=1
aφ,i · pφ,i ≤ A (3)
Notice that this differs from previous work like [1], in which
the vehicle intended to receive all messages {m|µi ≤ µ(m)}.
The advantage of our new model is the additional flexibility
provided by removing some of the message overlap among
neighboring vehicles, which improves the total impact of re-
ceived messages (via cellular and direct neighbor forwarding)
by each vehicles.
The utility each vehicle aims to maximize captures the value
of the received messages, i. e., refers to the sum of impact. The
utility is defined according to Equation 4 based on the sent
messages Msnt, the received messages Mrcv , and the impact
µ(m) of a message m. I{m∈Mrcv} is an indicator function
indicating whether a message m has been received by the
vehicle.
u =
∑
m∈Msnt
µ(m) · a(m) · I{m∈Mrcv} (4)
As the probability of a vehicle receiving a message depends
on ~pφ, we derive the expectation of the utility based on
Equation 4. For this purpose, we assume that the environment
of each vehicle is rather similar, so that the strategies of two
vehicles with the same privacy level are similar. Thus, the
strategy of every privacy level can be calculated by every
vehicle in proximity, which is the basis of our offloading
approach. Thus, we only use the strategies ~pφ along with the
number nφ of vehicles for each privacy level φ to calculate
the probability of receiving a message either via the cellular
network or from one of the neighbors. The probability p(µi)
to receive a message via any interface (Cellular or Wifi) with
at impact level µi can be calculated as shown in Equation 5.
This formula assumes that there is no loss in the network,
i. e., every transmitted messages is received by the intended
receiver.
p(µi) = 1−
∏
φ∈Φ
(1− pφ,i)nφ (5)
We use the probability p(µi) to receive a message to derive
the expected utility u(φe, ~p1, . . . , ~p|Φ|). This estimates the set
of received messages Mrcv using the expected amount of sent
messages ai and the probability p(µi) to receive each message.
The resulting expected utility for the tagged vehicle is shown
in Equation 6.
u(φe, ~p1, . . . , ~p|Φ|) =
nµ∑
i=1
µφe,i ·aφe,i ·
1−∏
φ∈Φ
(1− pφ,i)nφ

(6)
When clear from context, we refer to u(φe, ~p0, . . . , ~p|Φ|) as
u to increase readability. In the next section, we describe
the process of deriving a utility-maximizing strategy for the
described game. The advantage of determining the solution
analytically is (i) the possibility to analyze and bound the
effects of location privacy to the system, and (ii) the lower
computational complexity compared to a non-linear solver.
A. Game-Theoretic Solution
In this section, we derive the optimal strategy for a vehicle
with privacy level φe given that the privacy level and number
of vehicles in each privacy level in its environment is known.
For this purpose, we calculate the partial derivatives of the
expected utility u with respect to the probabilities of the
tagged vehicle pφ,i. However, it is important to consider
the dependency between the probabilities pφ,i,∀φ ∈ Φ, as
Equation 3 limits the possible values of pφ,i. This approach
would work similarly with any other probability pφ,i|i 6= 1. We
depict this dependency by expressing pφ,1 depending on the
other probabilities {pφ,i|i > 1} as shown in Equation 7. Thus,
pφ,1 depends on all other probabilities, i. e., the derivative of
pφ,1 with respect to any probability pφ,i is not always non-
zero, which leads to our optimization problem.
pφ,1 ≤ A−
∑nµ
i=2 aφ,i · pφ,i
aφ,1
(7)
While the inequality is sufficient to guarantee the bandwidth
requirements, we will assume Equation 7 to be an equation
as higher values of pφ,1 cannot decrease the utility. As there
is no dependency between any pair of probabilities pφ,i and
pφ,j if i 6= j ∧ i 6= 1 ∧ j 6= 1, the derivative of the utility
with respect to pφ,l depends only on pφ,1 and pφ,l for every
l > 1 as shown in Equation 8. Notice that µφe,i · aφe,i =
µi · ai according to Equation 1 and Equation 2. Additionally,
we assume that pφe,l 6= 0. We ensure that by considering the
cases with pφe,l = 0,∀l ∈ {1, . . . , nµ} separately as described
in Section V-B.
∂u
∂pφe,l
= µlalnφe · (1− pφe,l)nφe−1 · Pl(Φ \ {φe})+
µ1a1
(
∂pφe,1
∂pφe,l
)
nφe · (1− pφe,1)nφe−1 · P1(Φ \ {φe}) (8)
with
Pj(Φ) =
∏
φ∈Φ
(1− pφ,j)nφ
Equation 1 displays the dependency of pφe,1 and pφe,l. Thus,
the derivative of pφe,1 with respect to pφe,l can be calculated
according to Equation 9.
∂pφe,1
∂pφe,l
= − aφe,l
aφe,1
(9)
By setting the derivative of the utility to 0, we determine
all possibly optimal solutions. This leads to Equation 10
after some minor transformations. Notice that al and nφe, are
omitted as they are present on both sides of the equation.
µl · (1− pφe,l)nφe−1 · Pl(Φ \ {φe})
= µ1 ·
ρφe,l
ρφe,1
· (1− pφe,1)nφe−1 · P1(Φ \ {φe}) (10)
For a given impact level l, we divide the set of privacy levels
Φ into Φ+(l), which only contains privacy levels with pφ,l >
0, and Φ−(l), which contains privacy levels with pφ,l = 0.
This is necessary, as the derivative of the expected utility with
respect to pφ,l is always 0 if pφ,l = 0, thus, Equation 10 does
not hold. However, Equation 10 still contains pφ,l,∀φ ∈ Φ+(l)
and pφ,1,∀φ ∈ Φ(l). We need to replace pφ,l,∀φ ∈ Φ+(l)\φe
to calculate pφe,l. We can calculate the pφe,l using Equation 11
according to Theorem 2.
Theorem 2. For the probability pφe,l,∀φe ∈ Φ+(l) with
nφe > 1, Equation 11 holds. It depends only on pφe,l
and previously calculated probabilities and can be used to
calculate pφe,l.
µl · (1− pφe,l)n
+(l)
= µ1 · ρφe,l
ρφe,1
· (1− pφe,1)n
+(l) · P1(Φ−(l)) (11)
with
n+(l) =
∑
φ∈Φ+(l)
nφ − 1
Proof. We use full-induction to prove the correctness of Equa-
tion 11. For the base-case, we consider Φ = {φe}. Based on
Equation 10, we observe that P1(Φ\φe) = 1 and Pl(Φ\φe) =
1, as Φ contains only φe. Additionally, n+(l) = nφe − 1 for
the same reason, which immediately leads to Equation 11. For
the induction step, we use Φ++(l) ⊆ Φ+ and Φ+−(l) ⊆ Φ+ as
auxiliary variables with φ ∈ Φ++(l)⊕ Φ+−(l),∀φ ∈ Φ+(l), for
which the index states if they have already been included in
the calculation. Based on Equation 10 and Equation 11, we
can derive Equation 12 associated φe ∈ Φ+−(l) as intermediate
state of the calculation. Notice that φe ∈ Φ++ by assumption.
Additionally, the privacy levels in Φ− are not considered on
the left side of the equation, as pφ,l = 0,∀φ ∈ Φ−.
µl · (1− pφe,l)n
+
+(l) · Pl(Φ+− \ {φe})
= µ1 · ρφe,l
ρφe,1
· (1− pφe,1)n
+
+(l) · P1({Φ−(l) ∪ Φ+−(l)}) (12)
with
n++(l) =
∑
φ∈Φ++(l)
nφ − 1
We aim to include a privacy level φn into Φ++. Thus, we
solve Equation 12 associated with φn for pφn,l and insert it
into Equation 12 associated with all other φe ∈ Φ+−(l) \φn to
obtain Equation 13.
µl · (1− pφe,l)n
+
+(l)+nφn · Pl(Φ+− \ {φe, φn}) = µ1·
ρφel
ρφe1
(1− pφe,1)n
+
+(l)+nφn P1({Φ−(l) ∪ Φ+−(l)} \ φn) (13)
This equation is similar to our initial Equation 12 if we set
Φ++ = Φ
+
+∪φn and Φ+− = Φ+− \φn. Additionally, it is evident
that Equation 13 is equal to Equation 11 if Φ++ = Φ
+ and
Φ+− = ∅.
Equation 11 still contains pφe,1 as an auxiliary variable.
When replacing pφe,1 according to its definition in Equation 7,
we can derive the remaining variables pφe,i,∀i > 1 only based
on the other variables pφe,i,∀i > 1. For that purpose, we
introduce the variable Λl with 1 < l ≤ nµ as defined in
Equation 15, which encapsulates the constant values and the
dependency on other privacy levels φ for readability. Thus,
we can transform Equation 11 to Equation 14 by taking the
n+(l)-th root and replacing pφe,1.
Algorithm 1: Determining the optimal strategy for all
privacy-levels. recal(. . .) recalculates pφe,i based on the
current values of pφ,i.  is the infinitesimal.
Result: pφ,i,∀φ ∈ Φ, i ∈ {1, . . . , nµ}
1 pφ,i ← 0,∀φ ∈ Φ, i ∈ {1, . . . , nµ};
2 c←∞;
3 for i← 1; c > ; i← (i mod |Φ|) + 1 do
4 tempj ← pi,j ,∀j ∈ {1, . . . , nµ};
5 recal(pi,j),∀j ∈ {1, . . . , nµ};
6 c←∑nµj=1 |tempj − pi,j |;
7 end
8 return pφ,i,∀φ ∈ Φ, i ∈ {1, . . . , nµ};
1− pφe,l =
[
1−
(
A
aφe,1
−
nµ∑
i=2
aφe,i · pφe,i
aφe,1
)]
· Λl (14)
with
Λi = n+(i)
√√√√(µ1
µi
)
·
(
ρφe,i
ρφe,1
)
·
∏
φ∈Φ−(i)
(1− pφ,1)nφ (15)
The equation system described by Equation 14 for all
2 ≤ l ≤ nµ cannot be solved without considering the
dependency on the other privacy levels encapsulated in Λl.
However, this dependency is hard to resolve except for some
special cases, as it removes the linearity from Equation 14.
Thus, we assume that Λl is constant for the calculation of
pφe,l,∀ l = {2, . . . , nµ}. Thus, we can represent pφe,j 6= 0 as
pφe,i 6= 0 by subtracting the representation of pφe,i from the
representation of pφe,j according to Equation 14 and obtain
Equation 16.
pφe,i = Λi
(
pφe,j − 1
Λj
)
+ 1 (16)
With this assumption, we can calculate every pφl,l with
Equation 17, which can be derived from Equation 14 and the
representation of any pφe,i as pφe,j from Equation 16. Notice,
that Λ1 = 1, as either pφ,1 = 0 (then 1 − pφ,1 = 1 and
disappears), or pφ,1 6= 0 (then φ /∈ Φ−(1)).
pφe,l =
[
A−∑nµi=1|i 6=l∧φe /∈Φ−(i) aφe,i]Λl∑nµ
i=1|i 6=l∧φe /∈Φ−(i) (aφe,i · Λi)
+ 1 (17)
Based on Equation 17, we can determine the strategies for
each privacy level using Algorithm 1. This algorithm ensures
that the initial error (induced by setting all probabilities to 0)
converges, i.e the initial error constantly reduces for each iter-
ation of Algorithm 1. This algorithm converges immediately if
there is no inter-dependency between the privacy levels, i. e.,
if there is no other privacy level φo | pφo,i = 0. If there is
an inter-dependency, it converges due to three factors: (i) In
the calculation of pφ,1, all probabilities pφ,i with i > 1 are
utilized, thus, pφ,1 balances the error of the other probabilities.
(ii) pφ,1 influences Λi of all privacy levels in Φ−(i), but we
can see that Λl in the nominator and Λi in the denominator
partially cancel out the error of each other in Equation 17. (iii)
∃l, φ | nφ < n+(l), in which case the error in Λl gets reduced
based on the errors of the other privacy levels.
B. Deriving the Utility-Optimal Strategy
In the previous section, we assumed that every probabil-
ity under consideration is non-zero. To calculate the overall
optimal strategy, we consider every possible combination of
zero and non-zero probabilities of every privacy level, i. e.,
we consider every possible combination of Φ+(l) and Φ−(l).
That is, the computational complexity of our approach is
O(2|Φ|·nµ), i. e., is exponential with the number of privacy
levels |Φ| and the number of impact levels nµ. This ex-
ponential growth is justified by the separate consideration
of zero probabilities, which leads to 2 tries per probability.
While an exponential growth is generally bad, we need to
remember the limited size of |Φ| and nµ. As every single
computation of probabilities is very fast, the total computation
time of the probabilities remains comparably small (in our
experiments, it stayed around 100ms). In the calculation,
we set the probabilities of all pφ,l = 0 | φ ∈ Φ−(l) and
only calculate the remaining probabilities with our approach
proposed in the previous section.
VI. ANALYSIS AND REQUIRED ADAPTATION
In this section, we analyze the properties of the solution
for our non-cooperative game and the implications for real-
world applicability. We start with a analysis of the properties
of our approach. Next, we perform a numerical analysis of our
developed solution, with the goal to showcase the influence of
location privacy on a heterogeneous network in a controlled
environment. The numerical analysis includes the bandwidth
dependency of our approach, the performance depending on
the neighborhood, and the consequences of different neighbor-
hood of vehicles.
A. Properties of the Developed Solution
Our found solution has certain properties, on which we
elaborate in the following.
1) Optimality: For each possible set of Φ+(j),∀j ∈
{1, . . . , nµ}, the partial derivatives of the utility with respect
to all probabilities are 0, i. e., are either local optima or saddle
points. To proof that the found solutions are global optima, we
need to ensure that there is no other optimum with a higher
utility than the found solution. For this purpose, we investigate
on the second derivative of the utility function as shown in
Equation 18.
∂2u
∂2pφe,l
= −µl · Ψl − µ1 ·
al
a0
·
(
− ρφe,l
ρφe,1
)2
· Ψ1 (18)
with
Ψj = al ·nφe · (nφe − 1) · (1− pφe,l)nφe−2 ·Pj(φ ∈ Φ \ {φe})
As Ψi, µi, and ai are non negative for all i, the second
derivative of the utility with respect to any probability pφe,l
is always smaller or equal to 0. Thus, the expected utility
presented in Equation 6 is concave. This guarantees that the
found solution maximizes the utility, but is not necessarily
unique, i. e., there might be other solutions with similar utility.
2) Stability: According to Theorem 3, the found solution
of our non-cooperative game is an unstable Nash equilibrium.
Thus, this equilibrium is only followed if every vehicle is
aware that its neighbors follow this strategy.
Theorem 3. The solution of our non-cooperative game shown
in Equation 17 is an unstable Nash equilibrium, i. e., no
vehicle has an incentive to deviate from the found solution.
Proof. First, we show that Equation 17 is a Nash equilibrium.
For that purpose, we modify Equation 6 such that the strategy
~q of the tagged vehicle is not necessarily similar to the
strategy of its neighbors. We refer to this modified utility with
u∗(φe, q, ~p0, . . . , ~p|Φ|) as shown in Equation 19. For better
readability, we omit the parameters when clear from context.
u∗ =
nµ∑
i=1
µφe,i · aφe,i ·
[
1− Pi · (1− pφe)nφe,i−1 · (1− qi)
]
(19)
By assumption, the tagged vehicle also needs to stick to its
bandwidth requirements, thus, Equation 7 holds. As a lower
utilization of bandwidth cannot increase the utility (as the
bandwidth is not part of the utility function), we assume the
bandwidth inequality to be an equality. As the the modified
expected utility is rather similar to the expected utility, we can
derive:
∂u∗
∂ql
· nφe =
∂u
∂pφe,l
,∀ l ∈ {1, . . . , nµ}
As the partial derivative of the expected utility is 0 in our
solution, it follows that the partial derivative of the modified
expected utility is also 0. This is shown in Equation 20.
∂u
∂pφe,l
= 0⇒ ∂u
∗
∂ql
= 0,∀ l ∈ {1, . . . , nµ} (20)
Additionally, the second derivative is always 0, as the first
derivative of modified expected utility u∗ for any ql is indepen-
dent of ql. Thus, any strategy that fully utilizes the available
bandwidth for the tagged vehicle is optimal, as long as the
derivative is valid, which assumes the same setup of zero and
non-zero probabilities. A different setup of zero and non-zero
probabilities can never be better, as this setup is better for the
overall solution, i. e., would have been selected. Consequently,
the found solution is an unstable Nash equilibrium.
3) Implicit Coordination of Responsibility: As described
in Section V-B, our approach selects the optimal strategy for
every privacy level by choosing a strategy composed of zero
and non-zero probabilities. Thus, our approach is capable of
assigning tasks to certain privacy levels. A single privacy level
might be sufficient to ensure the reception of data of a certain
Parameter Value
Bandwidth 10% of required
Event impact (vector) (1, 10, 100, 1000)
Event frequency (vector) (90%, 9%, 0.9%, 0.1%)
Event distribution range (vector) (10km, 1km, 100km, 100km)
TABLE I: Default parameters of the numerical analysis and
the evaluation.
privacy level, such that |Φ+(j)| = 1,∀j ∈ {1, . . . , nµ}. Thus,
the other privacy levels do not aim to receive the messages of
this impact level, but use their bandwidth for the reception
of messages of different impact levels. In general, privacy
levels with a low imprecision aim to receive messages with
high context-sensitivity, i. e., a small message dissemination
distance ri. On the other hand, privacy-aware vehicles will
aim to receive messages with a high message dissemination
distance ri, as the effects of location privacy is smaller for this
type of messages as shown in Theorem 1. This coordination
of responsibility drastically improves the performance of our
offloading approach, but also introduces additional challenges
regarding the possibility of errors in this coordination. We
provide a deeper insight in these errors in Section VI-B.
B. Numerical Analysis of Influence Factors
In the following, we investigate two properties of our
approach by performing a numerical analysis: (i) the com-
pensation of negative impacts of location privacy, and (ii)
the influence of wrong estimation of the neighborhood of
vehicles in proximity. The default parameters for the numerical
evaluation can be found in Table I.
a) Compensation for Location Privacy: Figure 1 dis-
plays the ability of our proposed solution to compensate for
location privacy of vehicles in the network. It is evident,
that the possibility of compensation depends on the degree
of location privacy in the system, which is influenced by
the radius of the imprecision area and the share of privacy-
sensitive vehicles in the system. Figure 1a displays the influ-
ence of a comparably low level of location privacy, in which
the radius of the imprecision area is only 100m. For this
scenario, the influence of privacy is minimal, as the system
also benefits from the possibility of coordination as described
in subsubsection VI-A3. For a large area of imprecision like
in Figure 1b, the performance slightly decreases with an
increasing share of privacy-sensitive vehicles until roughly
85% of privacy-sensitive vehicles. However, when we assume
a system in which the majority of vehicles is privacy-sensitive,
an increase in the share of privacy-agnostic vehicles provides
a huge performance gain to the system. This finding is very
interesting, as it enables the compensation for location privacy
of a subset of vehicles even for high privacy levels.
b) Wrong Neighborhood Estimation: Figure 2 displays
the changes in utility if the vehicles of a certain privacy-
level have a different number of neighbors than the vehicle
in another privacy level. This leads to a wrong prediction of
the strategy of the other privacy level, as the assumption of
a similar neighborhood as presented in Section V does not
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Fig. 1: Utility depending on bandwidth and privacy.
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Fig. 2: Difference between expected utility and actual utility.
hold. Figure 2a shows the influence of an overestimation of
the number of neighbors, i. e., the neighborhood of a vehicle
in proximity of the tagged vehicle is larger than the actual
neighborhood of the tagged vehicle. An overestimation of the
number of neighbors seems to produce only minor issues, as
the loss of utility is always below or equal 0.6%. Compared
to that, the underestimation severely impacts the performance
of our approach, which leads to a loss of up to 50% in
certain situations. Additionally, it can be observed that the
loss in performance is only significant at the diagonal of the
plot, i. e., if the number of privacy-sensitive and not privacy-
sensitive vehicles is close. This is justified as the privacy
level with a higher influence (with more vehicles) has more
possibility to cover certain impact levels, such that the other
privacy levels cover the remaining impact levels. However, if
both privacy levels assume that they are the more influential,
this approach fails, leading to impact levels that are not
covered by any privacy level. This leads to a severe drop
in performance and needs to be prevented. To achieve this,
we need to restrict the implicit assignment of impact levels to
certain privacy levels. Thus, we perform a worst-case analysis,
i. e., the vehicle checks what happens if its neighbors do
not cooperate. Depending on the trust in its neighbors, the
expected utility with neighbors and the worst-case utility are
weighted to receive the final score of a strategy.
VII. EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our approach
in a realistic vehicular network under varying environmental
conditions. For this purpose, we utilize the vehicular exten-
sion of the Simonstrator framework [23] in conjunction with
SUMO [24] to simulate a vehicular network in Cologne [25].
We compare our approach with state-of-the-art methods for
cooperative communication in large-scale vehicular networks
and non-cooperative approaches. In this large-scale vehicular
network, messages are provided based on the current location
of the vehicle (considering its privacy restrictions). In our
simulation, we generate messages randomly in an area of
roughly 220× 220km2, while the movement of vehicles and
their networking is only simulated in an area of 2 × 2km2
to reduce the computational overhead. As all events with a
possible influence to the network are simulated, we accurately
model the message load in a large-scale vehicular network.
A. Reference Approaches
In the following, we describe the evaluated approaches.
1) Game-Theoretic Privacy-Sensitive Cooperation (GTP):
This is our approach proposed in Section V, which relies on
implicit coordination between vehicles.
2) No Cooperation (NC): The No-Cooperation (NC) ap-
proach does not consider cooperation between vehicles. Thus,
vehicles using the NC approach receive similar messages as
their neighbors, i. e., cannot share their messages.
3) Clustering with perfect failure detection (GK): Clus-
tering is a common strategy for the local distribution of
messages in vehicular networks. Instead of every vehicle com-
municating, only the so-called cluster-head is communicating
directly with the server and provides received messages to
vehicles in proximity via V2V communication. This clustering
approach can detect disconnects immediately and is used as an
(unrealistic) upper bound for the performance of our approach.
4) Clustering without perfect failure detection (CL): This
clustering approach is similar to the previous approach, with
the exception that the detection of disconnects is now imper-
fect. Thus, the vehicles need to wait for a timeout until they
detect a disconnect and reorganize the cluster. This approach
is more realistic than the previous GK approach.
B. Metrics
We use two metrics to evaluate the performance of our
approach: the achieved relative utility and the used bandwidth.
The achieved relative utility measures the performance of the
network, i. e., how much data is provided to a vehicle in the
network. This metric is between 0 and 1, where 1 states that the
vehicle has received everything that was sent and 0 states that
the vehicle has received nothing. The used bandwidth captures
if the approaches stick to their average bandwidth limitations,
i. e., if the side condition of the game is fulfilled.
C. Plots
We use box-plots and line-plots to visualize our results. In
the box-plots, the boxes show the differences between vehicles
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Fig. 3: Achieved relative bandwidth for different bandwidths.
inside of one simulation run. Next to each box, there is a line
with a dot, visualizing the average value over all vehicles and
simulation runs and the standard deviation of the average of
all vehicles. In line-plot, the line displays the mean value for
the vehicles in one simulation run.
D. Evaluation Results
Figure 3 depicts the performance of the approaches under
different available bandwidths to each individual vehicle. It
is evident that the performance of all approaches increases
with increasing bandwidth for all approaches as depicted by
Figure 3a. For a full reception of all data available in the
network via cellular, a bandwidth of roughly 100 messages per
second is required. Even with a much smaller bandwidth of 10
messages per second, all approaches can achieve reasonable
utility levels by prioritizing high-impact messages. It can be
observed that our GTP approach outperforms the CL approach
as well as the NC approach and has much smaller confidence
intervals compared to the CL approach. Thus, our approach
is more resilient and adaptive to different network conditions.
Additionally, our approach is very close in performance to the
GK approach. The same holds for a bandwidth of 1, while
our approach decreases in performance for a bandwidth of
0.1. For a bandwidth of 0.1, our approach performs worse
than the CL approach, as the redundant transmission of high-
impact messages and the missing explicit coordination be-
tween vehicles decrease the performance of our GTP approach.
This is also confirmed by Figure 3b: For the high-impact
messages, our approach performs well for both a bandwidth of
1 and 10, but struggles to receives the high-impact messages
for a bandwidth of 0.1. That is, a bandwidth of 0.1 is not
sufficient to receive the high-impact messages using only the
available bandwidth of a single vehicle. Thus, the performance
of our approach decreases below the performance of the CL
approach, as the explicit coordination of vehicles in clustering
approaches can handle low bandwidths well. Additionally, all
approaches stick to the available bandwidth on average, while
the bandwidth is temporarily exceeded by a subset of vehicles.
This exceeding of bandwidth is justified by (i) the different
number of available messages depending on the event location
and (ii) the cooperative reception of messages by vehicles.
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Fig. 4: Achieved relative utility for mixed environments.
Figure 4 displays the influence of privacy on our realistic
vehicular network if the privacy-sensitive vehicles use an
area of imprecision with radius 10km. Figure 4a shows the
behavior of the relative utility for all of the approaches. The
NC approach decreases the most, as the privacy-sensitive
vehicles have no possibility to compensate for their context
imprecision. Additionally, our GTP approach constantly out-
performs the CL approach and the NC approach independent
of the level of privacy. Most interestingly, the performance
decrease of our GTP approach compared to the GK approach
is not constant, it is lowest around 50% privacy. This can
be justified by implicit coordination between privacy levels
as described in subsubsection VI-A3. This is also visible in
Figure 4b, which displays the relative utility of messages with
an impact between 10 and 100. While the NC approach is
not able to receive this messages at all, the utility of the
other approaches decreases constantly. However, for our GTP
approach, the utility remains constant for a very long duration,
which leads to a comparably constant overall utility even for
high privacy levels.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we introduce privacy considerations in the
management of FCD and have shown its impact on location-
based services, since some data are not forwarded to a vehicle
due to privacy considerations and the implemented location
obfuscation. In order to alleviate this problem, we have intro-
duced cooperation among vehicles so as to forward relevant
data to their neighboring vehicles, enhancing in principle the
data received by a vehicle only directly from the remote server.
In this work, an ad-hoc, direct V2V cooperation paradigm
is employed instead of a cluster-based one, also showing the
high performance deterioration of the latter in a real vehicular
networking environment. A major contribution of this work
is the development and study of a non-cooperative game
determining the strategies (in terms of probabilities that a
vehicle is forwarded by the server data of a given impact
index) that vehicles should follow, so that a properly defined
utility is maximized; this is shown to lead to a diversification
of the data received directly from the server by neighboring
vehicles and increases the effectiveness of V2V cooperation.
Our numerical analysis show that the influence of privacy
can be compensated as long as the share of privacy-sensitive
vehicle is below 85%. Above that threshold, an increase in
the share of privacy-sensitive vehicles drastically decreases the
performance of the system. In the evaluation, we analyzed the
performance of our approach in a realistic vehicular network.
Our results show the drastic performance increase compared
to non-cooperative approaches and the improvements over
cluster-based approaches. Additionally, our approach performs
almost similarly to a perfect clustering approach, which uti-
lizes bandwidth optimally and detects disconnects immedi-
ately, but is not realizable in reality. When we analyze the
performance of our approach for different privacy levels, we
see that the performance remains constant for a long time,
which confirms the results from our numerical analysis.
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